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Abstract
Causal terminology is often introduced in the interpretation of encod-
ing and decoding models trained on neuroimaging data. In this article, we
investigate which causal statements are warranted and which ones are not
supported by empirical evidence. We argue that the distinction between
encoding and decoding models is not sufficient for this purpose: relevant
features in encoding and decoding models carry a different meaning in
stimulus- and in response-based experimental paradigms. We show that
only encoding models in the stimulus-based setting support unambigu-
ous causal interpretations. By combining encoding and decoding models
trained on the same data, however, we obtain insights into causal rela-
tions beyond those that are implied by each individual model type. We
illustrate the empirical relevance of our theoretical findings on EEG data
recorded during a visuo-motor learning task.
Index Terms— Encoding models; Decoding models; Interpretation; Causal
inference; Pattern recognition
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1 Introduction
The question how neural activity gives rise to cognition is arguably one of the
most interesting problems in neuroimaging [16, 42, 1]. Neuroimaging studies
per se, however, only provide insights into neural correlates but not into neural
causes of cognition [42, 33]. Nevertheless, causal terminology is often intro-
duced in the interpretation of neuroimaging data. For instance, Hamann writes
in a review on the neural mechanisms of emotional memory that “Hippocam-
pal activity in this study was correlated with amygdala activity, supporting the
view that the amygdala enhances explicit memory by modulating activity in the
hippocampus” [16], and Myers et al. note in a study on working memory that
“we tested [...] whether pre-stimulus alpha oscillations measured with electroen-
cephalography (EEG) influence the encoding of items into working memory”
[27] (our emphasis of causal terminology). The apparent contradiction between
the prevalent use of causal terminology and the correlational nature of neu-
roimaging studies gives rise to the following question: which causal statements
are and which ones are not supported by empirical evidence?
We argue that the answer to this question depends on the experimental set-
ting and on the type of model used in the analysis of neuroimaging data. Neu-
roimaging distinguishes between encoding and decoding models [28], known in
machine learning as generative and discriminative models [29]. Encoding mod-
els predict brain states, e. g. BOLD activity measured by fMRI or event-related
potentials measured by EEG/MEG, from experimental conditions [10, 11, 6].
Decoding models use machine learning algorithms to quantify the probability
of an experimental condition given a brain state feature vector [25, 31]. Several
recent publications have addressed the interpretation of encoding and decoding
models in neuroimaging, discussing topics such as potential confounds [40, 44],
the dimensionality of the neural code [7], and the relation of linear encoding and
decoding models [17]. We contribute to this discussion by investigating, for each
type of model, which causal statements are warranted and which ones are not
supported by empirical evidence. Our investigation is based on the seminal work
by Pearl [30] and Spirtes et al. [38] on causal inference (cf. [32, 15, 41, 26] for
applications of this framework in neuroimaging). We find that the distinction
between encoding and decoding models is not sufficient for this investigation.
It is further necessary to consider whether models work in causal or anti-causal
direction, i. e. whether they model the effect of a cause or the cause of an effect
[36]. To accommodate this distinction, we distinguish between stimulus- and
response-based paradigms. We then provide causal interpretation rules for each
combination of experimental setting (stimulus- or response-based) and model
type (encoding or decoding). We find that when considering one model at a
time, only encoding models in stimulus-based experimental paradigms support
unambiguous causal statements. Also, we demonstrate that by comparing en-
coding and decoding models trained on the same data, experimentally testable
conditions can be identified that provide further insights into causal structure.
These results enable us to reinterpret previous work on the relation of encoding
and decoding models in a causal framework [40, 44, 17].
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The empirical relevance of our theoretical results is illustrated on EEG data
recorded during a visuo-motor learning task. We demonstrate that an encoding
model allows us to determine EEG features that are effects of the instruction
to rest or to plan a reaching movement, but does not enable us to distinguish
between direct and indirect effects. By comparing relevant features in an en-
coding and a decoding model, we provide empirical evidence that sensorimotor
µ- and/or occipital α-rhythms (8–14 Hz) are direct effects, while brain rhythms
in higher cortical areas, including precuneus and anterior cingulate cortex, re-
spond to the instruction to plan a reaching movement only as a result of the
modulation by other cortical processes.
We note that while we have chosen to illustrate the empirical significance
of our results on neuroimaging data, and specifically on EEG recordings, the
provided causal interpretation rules apply to any encoding and decoding model
trained on experimental data. This provides a guideline to researchers on how
(not) to interpret encoding and decoding models when investigating the neural
basis of cognition. A preliminary version of this work has been presented in
[43].
2 Methods
We begin this section by introducing the causal framework by Pearl [30] and
Spirtes et al. [38] that our work is based on (section 2.1) and demonstrate how it
leads to testable predictions for the causal statements cited in the introduction
(section 2.2). We then introduce the distinction between causal and anti-causal
encoding and decoding models (section 2.3) and establish a connection between
these models and causal inference (section 2.4). This connection enables us to
present the causal interpretation rules for encoding and decoding models in sec-
tion 2.5. In section 2.6, we show that combining an encoding and a decoding
model trained on the same data can provide further insights into causal struc-
ture. We conclude this section by providing a reinterpretation of previous work
on encoding and decoding models in a causal framework (section 2.7).
2.1 Causal Bayesian Networks
By X we denote the finite set of d random variables representing the brain state
features, i. e. X = {X1, ..., Xd}. While these variables may correspond to any
type of independent and identically distributed (iid) samples of d brain state
features, it is helpful to consider bandpower features of different EEG channels,
trial-averaged BOLD activity at various cortical locations, or mean spike rates
of multiple neurons as possible examples. By C we denote the random vari-
able representing the (usually discrete) experimental condition. C stands for
a stimulus (C ≡ S) or response (C ≡ R) variable and it will be made clear
when C is restricted to either particular case. For convenience, we denote the
set of all random variables by X̂ = {C,X1, ..., Xd}. Throughout this article,
we denote marginal, conditional and joint distributions by P (X), P (X|C) and
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P (X,C), respectively (overloading the notation of P ). For our theoretical in-
vestigations, we assume that the involved distributions have probability mass
or density functions (PMFs or PDFs) with values denoted by P (x), P (x|c) and
P (x, c) respectively, again overloading the notation of P while it is always clear
from the argument which function is meant. We use the common notations for
independence and conditional independence
X ⊥ C :⇐⇒ P (X|C) = P (X),
X ⊥ C|Y :⇐⇒ P (X|C, Y ) = P (X|Y ).
In the framework of Causal Bayesian Networks (CBNs) [30, 38], a variableXi
is said to be a cause of another variable Xj if the distributions P (Xj |do(Xi =
xi)) are sensitive to xi (cf. [30], p. 24f.). In this notation, the intervention
do(Xi = xi) signifies that Xi is externally set to a constant xi, possibly resulting
in a change of the distribution of Xj . The framework of CBNs thus defines
cause-effect relations in terms of the impact of external manipulations. This is
in contrast to frameworks that define causality in terms of information transfer
[13, 35, 22].
Causal relations between variables in CBNs are represented by directed
acyclic graphs (DAGs). If we find a directed edge Xi → Xj , we call Xi a
direct cause of Xj and Xj a direct effect of Xi. In case there is no directed edge
but at least one directed path Xi 99K Xj , we call Xi an indirect cause of Xj and
Xj an indirect effect of Xi. Note that the terms (in-)direct cause/effect depend
on the set X̂ of observed variables: consider X̂ = {C,X1, X2} and the causal
DAG C → X1 → X2. Then C 99K X2 and C 6→ X2 wrt. X̂, while C → X2
wrt. X̂ ′ = {C,X2}. That is, whether a cause or effect is direct or indirect de-
pends on the set of observed brain state features. We omit the considered set
of nodes if it is clear from the context.
To establish a link between conditional independences and DAGs the follow-
ing concepts are required:
d-separation Disjoint sets of nodes A and B are d-separated by another dis-
joint set of nodes C if and only if all a ∈ A and b ∈ B are d-separated
by C. Two nodes a 6= b are d-separated by C if and only if every path
between a and b is blocked by C. A path between nodes a and b is blocked
by C if and only if there is an intermediate node z on the path such that
(i) z ∈ C and z is a tail-to-tail (← z →) or head-to-tail (→ z →) or (ii) z
is head-to-head (→ z ←) and neither z nor any of its descendants is in C.
Causal Markov Condition (CMC) The CMC expresses the notion that each
node in a causal DAG becomes independent of its non-descendants given
its direct causes, i. e. that the causal structure implies certain (conditional)
independences.
Faithfulness The faithfulness assumption states that all (conditional) indepen-
dences between the random variables of a DAG are implied by its causal
structure, i. e. there are no more (conditional) independences than those
implied by the CMC.
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Assuming faithfulness and the causal Markov condition, d-separation is
equivalent to conditional independence, i. e. C d-separates A and B if and only
if A and B are independent given C [38]. The following three examples are the
most relevant instances of d-separation for our following arguments. Firstly,
consider the chain X0 → X1 → X2. Here, X1 d-separates X0 and X2 by block-
ing the directed path from X0 to X2. This implies that X0 ⊥ X2|X1. Secondly,
consider the fork X0 ← X1 → X2. Here, X1 d-separates X0 and X2, as X1
is a joint cause of X0 and X2. This again implies that X0 ⊥ X2|X1. Thirdly,
consider the collider X0 → X1 ← X2. In this case, X1 does not d-separate X0
and X2. As X1 is a joint effect of X0 and X2, it unblocks the previously blocked
path between X0 and X2, implying that X0 6⊥ X2|X1.
The equivalence between d-separation and conditional independence enables
us to infer causal relations between variables in X̂ from observational data. By
identifying conditional independences that hold in our data, and mapping them
onto the equivalent d-separations, we gain knowledge about the causal structures
that can give rise to our data. This link forms the basis of the inference rules
we describe in section 2.5 and 2.6. We refer the interested reader to [26] for a
more exhaustive introduction to this causal inference framework in the context
of neuroimaging.
2.2 Causal terminology and CBNs
We now demonstrate how the causal statements, that we cited in the introduc-
tion to motivate our work, can be expressed in the framework of CBNs.
Firstly, consider the statement “Hippocampal activity in this study was cor-
related with amygdala activity, supporting the view that the amygdala enhances
explicit memory by modulating activity in the hippocampus” [16]. Here, it is
implicitly assumed that hippocampal activity is a cause of explicit memory;
that is, manipulating hippocampal activity results in measurable changes in
explicit memory. In the notation of CBNs, this is expressed as hippocampal
activity → explicit memory. Further, it is implied that the amygdala enhances
explicit memory via modulating activity in the hippocampus; that is, manip-
ulating activity in the amygdala leads to measurable changes in hippocampal
activity, which results in changes in explicit memory. This gives the causal
hypothesis amygdala activity → hippocampal activity → explicit memory. As-
suming faithfulness and the CMC, this causal hypothesis makes the empirically
testable predictions amygdala activity 6⊥ explicit memory and amygdala activity
⊥ explicit memory | hippocampal activity.
Secondly, consider the statement “we tested [...] whether pre-stimulus alpha
oscillations measured with electroencephalography (EEG) influence the encod-
ing of items into working memory” [27]. The authors thereby express the no-
tion that pre-stimulus alpha oscillations are a cause of working memory; that is,
manipulating pre-stimulus alpha oscillations has a measurable effect on work-
ing memory. This gives the causal hypothesis pre-stimulus alpha oscillations
→ working memory. Again assuming faithfulness and the CMC, this causal
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hypothesis makes the empirically testable prediction pre-stimulus alpha oscilla-
tions 6⊥ working memory.
In the following, we investigate how these empirical predictions can be tested
by encoding and decoding models, and under which conditions these predictions
are sufficient to prove a causal hypothesis. In section 2.7.3 we revisit those two
examples illustrating our theoretical results.
2.3 Causal and anti-causal encoding and decoding models
An encoding model P (X|C) represents how various experimental conditions are
encoded in the brain state feature vector. We ask “How does the brain state look
like given a certain experimental condition?”. Examples for encoding models are
the general linear model [10] or the class-conditional mean E{X|C}.
A decoding model P (C|X) represents how experimental conditions can be
inferred from the brain state feature vector [25]. We ask “How likely is an
experimental condition given a certain brain state feature vector?”. Decoding
models are for example obtained using support vector machines (SVMs) or linear
regression with X as the independent and C as the dependent variable.
A priori, encoding and decoding models are oblivious to the causal relation
between experimental conditions and brain state features, i. e. they disregard
whether they model the effect of a cause or the cause of an effect [36]. As we show
in section 2.4, however, this has implications for their interpretation. We hence
introduce the distinction between stimulus- and response-based experimental
paradigms.
We categorize an experimental setup as stimulus-based, if the experimental
conditions precede the measured brain states. An example of a stimulus-based
setup is the investigation of the brain’s activity when exposed to auditory stim-
uli. As the auditory stimuli precede the measured brain activity, the brain state
features cannot be a cause of the stimuli. In the stimulus-based setting, an
encoding model P (X|C) ≡ P (X|S) works in causal direction, as it models the
effect of a cause. A decoding model P (C|X) ≡ P (S|X) works in anti-causal
direction, as it models the cause of an effect. We note that in the stimulus-based
setting we can control for and randomize the stimulus, i. e. we can externally
set the stimulus to a desired value denoted by do(S = s).
We categorize an experimental setup as response-based, if the measured
brain states precede the experimental conditions. An example of a response-
based setup is the prediction of the laterality of a movement from pre-movement
brain state features. As the measured brain state features precede the ac-
tual movement, the movement cannot be a cause of this brain activity. In
the response-based setting, an encoding model P (X|C) ≡ P (X|R) works in
anti-causal direction, as it models the cause of an effect. A decoding model
P (C|X) ≡ P (R|X) works in causal direction, as it models the effect of a cause.
We note that in contrast to the stimulus-based setting, we cannot control for
and randomize the response, i. e. we cannot set the response to a desired value
by an external intervention.
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We also note that more complex experimental paradigms, in which responses
act again as stimuli [12], can also be categorized in this way by considering
time-resolved variables, e. g. stimulus[t0] → brain activity[t1] → response[t2]→
stimulus[t3].
In the following, we hence distinguish between four types of models:
1. Causal encoding models – P (X|S)
2. Anti-causal decoding models – P (S|X)
3. Anti-causal encoding models – P (X|R)
4. Causal decoding models – P (R|X)
2.4 Relating encoding and decoding models to causal in-
ference
In this section, we establish a link between causal inference and the identification
of relevant features in encoding and decoding models. This link forms the basis
for the causal interpretation rules in the next section.
When using an encoding model to analyze neuroimaging data, we wish to
identify features that show a statistically significant variation across experi-
mental conditions. In practice, this can be carried out by a variety of meth-
ods including but not limited to a general linear model [10], class-conditional
differences in mean activation [8], and non-linear independence tests [14, 15].
Common to all these approaches is that they admit univariate statistical tests
to quantify the likelihood of the data under the null-hypothesis Xi ⊥ C. Fea-
tures, for which the null-hypothesis of independence is rejected, are considered
relevant for the encoding model in this experimental paradigm. Features with
insufficient evidence for rejection of the null-hypothesis are considered irrele-
vant for the present encoding model. The set of relevant and irrelevant features
in an encoding model is subsequently denoted as X+enc and X–enc, respec-
tively. Assuming faithfulness, the relevance of features in an encoding model
can be translated into d-separation properties that provide insights into the
causal structure of the data-generating process. In particular, features in X–enc
are d-separated from the experimental condition by the empty set while features
in X+enc are not d-separated from the experimental condition by the empty set.
When using a decoding model to analyze neuroimaging data, we wish to
identify features that help in decoding the experimental condition; that is,
we wish to determine for each feature if its removal increases the minimum
Bayes error. If X1 ⊥ C|X \ X1 the Bayes classifier argmaxc P (c|x1, ..., xd) =
argmaxc P (c|x2, ..., xd) and hence also the Bayes error rate remain unchanged.
This leads to the mathematical concept of conditional independence for a fea-
ture’s relevance in decoding [39]: a featureXi is relevant for decoding ifXi 6⊥C|X\
Xi. In practice, one commonly used approach is to permute a feature with
respect to the experimental conditions and check if this results in a statis-
tically significant decrease in decoding accuracy [3]. Features, for which the
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null-hypothesis of conditional independence is rejected, are considered relevant
for the decoding model. Features with insufficient evidence for rejection of the
null-hypothesis are considered irrelevant for decoding the experimental condi-
tion given the other features. The set of relevant and irrelevant features in a
decoding model is subsequently denoted as X+dec and X–dec, respectively. As-
suming faithfulness again, every feature Xi ∈ X–dec is d-separated from the
experimental condition by the set X \Xi, while every feature Xi ∈ X+dec is not
d-separated from the experimental condition by the set X \Xi.
The link between the relevance of features in encoding and decoding models
and d-separation properties allows us to provide the causal interpretation rules
given in the next section. For our theoretical arguments, we assume that we
can identify all relevant features for each type of model, that is, we assume we
can identify all (conditional) (in-)dependence relations. We discuss the practi-
cal intricacies of identifying independence relations on finite empirical data in
section 4.
2.5 Causal interpretation rules for encoding and decoding
models
2.5.1 Causal encoding models P (X|S)
According to Reichenbach’s principle [34], the dependency between S and Xi ∈
X+enc implies that S → Xi, S ← Xi, or S ← H → Xi with H a joint common
cause of S and Xi. In the stimulus-based setting, we can control for and ran-
domize the stimulus. This enables us to rule out the last two cases and conclude
that S → Xi, i. e. the features in X+enc are effects of S [18].
In contrast, for Xi ∈ X–enc we have S ⊥ Xi, which allows us to conclude
that features in X–enc are not effects of S.
As such, all relevant features in a causal encoding model are effects of S,
while irrelevant features are not effects of S. We hence have the following two
interpretation rules:
Interpretation rule S1. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X+enc ⇐⇒ Xi is an effect of S, i. e. S 99K Xi
Interpretation rule S2. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X–enc ⇐⇒ Xi is not an effect of S, i. e. S 699K Xi
2.5.2 Anti-causal decoding models P (S|X)
We describe two counterexamples that show that features in X+dec are not
necessarily effects of S and that features in X–dec can be effects of S.
Firstly, assume S → X1 ← X2. Since X1 does not d-separate S and X2,
i. e. S 6⊥ X2|X1, we obtain that X2 ∈ X+dec although X2 is not an effect of S.
Secondly, assume S → X1 → X2. Since X1 d-separates S and X2, i. e. S ⊥
X2|X1, we have X2 ∈ X–dec although X2 is an effect of S.
8
This establishes that interpreting relevant features in anti-causal decoding
models has two drawbacks. Firstly, features in X+dec are only potentially effects
of S. And secondly, effects of S might be missed, since effects are not necessarily
relevant for decoding the experimental condition. This yields the following two
interpretation rules:
Interpretation rule S3. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X+dec 6⇐⇒ Xi is an effect of S, i. e. S 99K Xi
Interpretation rule S4. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X–dec 6⇐⇒ Xi is not an effect of S, i. e. S 699K Xi
2.5.3 Anti-causal encoding models P (X|R)
According to Reichenbach’s principle, the dependency between Xi ∈ X+enc and
R implies that Xi → R, Xi ← R, or Xi ← H → R with H a joint common
cause of Xi and R. A priori, we know that brain activity → response. This
enables us to rule out the case Xi ← R. We now show that one cannot uniquely
determine which of the last two scenarios is the case, i. e. features in X+enc are
only potentially causes of R. Consider X2 ← X1 → R. In this case, we have
X1 6⊥ R and X2 6⊥ R and therefore X1, X2 ∈ X+enc. But note that X1 → R
while X2 699K R, i. e. X2 is not a cause of R. This shows that features in X+enc
are not necessarily causes of R.
Features in X–enc, on the other hand, are independent of R and hence cannot
be causes of R.
As such, not all relevant features in anti-causal encoding models are causes
of R, while irrelevant features are indeed not causal for R. We hence have the
following two interpretation rules:
Interpretation rule R1. For C ≡ R:
Xi ∈ X+enc ⇐⇒ Xi is only potentially a cause of R,
i. e. Xi 99K R or Xi L99 H 99K R
Interpretation rule R2. For C ≡ R:
Xi ∈ X–enc =⇒ Xi is not a cause of R,
i. e. Xi 699K R
2.5.4 Causal decoding models P (R|X)
We describe two counterexamples that show that one can neither conclude that
features in X+dec are causes of R nor that features in X–dec are not causes of
R.
Firstly, consider X2 → X1 ← H → R where H is a hidden common cause
of X1 and R, yet H is a non-observable brain state feature. We have X1, X2 ∈
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X+dec in this example, as X1 as well as X2 are d-separated from R only by the
non-observable common cause H. But both X1 and X2 are not causes of R.
Secondly, assume X2 → X1 → R. Since X1 d-separates X2 and R, i. e. X2 ⊥
R|X1, we have X2 ∈ X–dec although X2 is a cause of R.
This establishes that interpreting relevant features in causal decoding models
has two drawbacks. Firstly, features in X+dec are not necessarily causes of
R. Secondly, causes of R might be missed, since causes are not necessarily
relevant for decoding the experimental condition. This yields the following two
interpretation rules:
Interpretation rule R3. For C ≡ R:
Xi ∈ X+dec 6⇐⇒ Xi is a cause of R, i. e. Xi 99K R
Interpretation rule R4. For C ≡ R:
Xi ∈ X–dec 6⇐⇒ Xi is not a cause of R, i. e. Xi 699K R
2.5.5 Subsumption
In the previous subsections, we showed that the interpretation of relevant fea-
tures in encoding and decoding models depends on the experimental setting.
This justifies our argument that the distinction of encoding and decoding mod-
els is not sufficient to determine their causal interpretation. In particular we
argued that, without employing further assumptions,
1. (cf. 2.5.1.) causal encoding models P (X|S) identify all effects of S in X̂.
2. (cf. 2.5.2.) anti-causal decoding models P (S|X) only identify some features
being potentially effects of S in X̂.
3. (cf. 2.5.3.) anti-causal encoding models P (X|R) identify all features being
potentially causes of R in X̂.
4. (cf. 2.5.4.) causal decoding models P (R|X) only identify some features being
potentially causes of R in X̂.
2.6 Causal interpretation rules for combined encoding and
decoding models
In section 2.5, we showed that only encoding models in a stimulus-based setting
support unambiguous causal statements. This result appears to imply that
decoding models, despite their gaining popularity in neuroimaging, are of little
value for investigating the neural causes of cognition. In the following, we argue
that this is not the case. Specifically, we show that by combining encoding and
decoding models, we gain insights into causal structure that are not possible
by investigating each type of model individually. In analogy to section 2.5, we
again distinguish between stimulus- and response-based paradigms.
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For a combined analysis of encoding and decoding models, we intuitively
extend our notation and define the following four sets of brain state features,
which yield a disjoint partition of X:
X+enc+dec := X
+enc ∩X+dec
X+enc–dec := X
+enc ∩X–dec
X–enc+dec := X–enc ∩X+dec
X–enc–dec := X–enc ∩X–dec
We now provide causal interpretation rules for each type of feature set and
experimental setting.
2.6.1 Stimulus-based setting
Features relevant in encoding and relevant in decoding: X+enc+dec
As Xi ∈ X+enc, it is an effect of S (rule S1). Intuitively, the fact that fur-
thermore Xi ∈ X+dec suggests that Xi is in some sense closer to S. Figure
1, however, establishes that this intuition is not correct. Since S 6⊥ X2 and
S 6⊥ X2|{X1, X3}, we have X2 ∈ X+enc+dec even though X2 is an indirect effect
of S. Hence, features that are relevant in both encoding and decoding do not
provide further insights into causal structure. This leads to the following inter-
pretation rule (note the missing bi-implication compared to interpretation rule
S1):
Interpretation rule S5. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X+enc+dec =⇒ Xi is an effect of S, i. e. S 99K Xi
Features relevant in encoding and irrelevant in decoding: X+enc–dec
As Xi ∈ X+enc, it holds that Xi is an effect of S (rule S1). Only looking at the
encoding side, however, does not determine whether Xi is a direct (S → Xi) or
indirect effect (S 99K Xi) of S wrt. X̂. As Xi ∈ X–dec, however, S and Xi are
d-separated by the set X \Xi (cf. section 2.4). This rules out that Xi is a direct
effect of S wrt. X̂, leaving S 99K Xi as the only explanation. This leads to the
following interpretation rule:
Interpretation rule S6. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X+enc–dec =⇒ Xi is an indirect effect of S wrt. X̂
Features irrelevant in encoding and relevant in decoding: X–enc+dec
As Xi ∈ X–enc, it is not an effect of S (rule S2). As further Xi ∈ X+dec, Xi
and S are not d-separated by X \Xi. This implies that Xi is either a cause of
variables in X \ Xi or that Xi and X \ Xi share at least one common cause.
Examples of these scenarios are S → X1 ← X2 and S → X1 ← H → X2. In
both cases, knowledge about X2 can be used to better decode S from X1 by
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S X1 X2
X3
Figure 1: The causal DAG illustrates that X2 ∈ X+enc+dec does not imply that X2
is a direct effect of S wrt. X̂.
removing variations in X1 that are not due to S. This leads to the following
interpretation rule:
Interpretation rule S7. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X–enc+dec =⇒ Xi provides brain state context wrt. S
Features irrelevant in encoding and irrelevant in decoding: X–enc–dec
Features in X–enc–dec are neither effects of S (rule S2) nor do they provide brain
state context wrt. S. Hence, they can be considered irrelevant for the present
experimental context. This is summarized in the following interpretation rule:
Interpretation rule S8. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X–enc–dec =⇒ Xi is neither an effect of S nor provides brain state context
2.6.2 Response-based setting
Features relevant in encoding and relevant in decoding: X+enc+dec
As Xi ∈ X+enc, it is potentially a cause of R (rule R1). Intuitively, the fact
that furthermore Xi ∈ X+dec suggests that Xi is in some sense closer to R, e. g.
that Xi is a cause of R. The DAG X1 ← H → R, however, establishes that
this intuition is not correct. Since R 6⊥ X1, we have X1 ∈ X+enc+dec , even though
X1 is not a cause of R. Hence, features that are relevant in both encoding and
decoding do not provide further insights into causal structure. This leads to
the following interpretation rule (note the missing bi-implication compared to
interpretation rule R1):
Interpretation rule R5. For C ≡ R:
Xi ∈ X+enc+dec =⇒ Xi is only potentially a cause of R,
i. e. Xi 99K R or Xi L99 H 99K R
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Features relevant in encoding and irrelevant in decoding: X+enc–dec
As Xi ∈ X+enc, it holds that Xi 99K R or Xi L99 H 99K R (rule R1). Although
we cannot distinguish between those two scenarios, we can learn more about
Xi from its irrelevance in decoding. Xi → R would imply that Xi and R are
not d-separated by X \Xi and hence Xi ∈ X+enc+dec . Thus, Xi cannot be a direct
cause of R wrt. X̂. This leads to the following interpretation rule:
Interpretation rule R6. For C ≡ R:
Xi ∈ X+enc–dec =⇒ Xi is no direct cause of R wrt. X̂
Features irrelevant in encoding and relevant in decoding: X–enc+dec
As Xi 6∈ X–enc, it is not a cause of R (rule R2). As further Xi ∈ X+dec, Xi
and R are not d-separated by X \Xi. This implies that Xi is either a cause of
variables in X \Xi or that Xi and X \Xi share at least one common cause. An
example of this scenario is X2 → X1 ← H → R. Here, knowledge about X2 can
be used to better decode R from X1 by removing variations in X1 that are not
due to H. In analogy to the stimulus-based setting, this leads to the following
interpretation rule:
Interpretation rule R7. For C ≡ R:
Xi ∈ X–enc+dec =⇒ Xi provides brain state context wrt. R
Features irrelevant in encoding and irrelevant in decoding: X–enc–dec
Features in X–enc–dec are neither causes of R (rule R2) nor do they provide brain
state context wrt. R. Hence, they can be considered irrelevant for the present
experimental context. This leads to the following interpretation rule:
Interpretation rule R8. For C ≡ S:
Xi ∈ X–enc–dec =⇒ Xi is neither a cause of R nor provides brain state context
2.6.3 Subsumption
We summarize all causal interpretation rules in Table 1. Combining encoding
and decoding models is particularly useful if features turn out to be relevant
in only one type of model: features only relevant in encoding are not direct
effects/causes, while features only relevant for decoding do provide brain state
context wrt. S/R while not being effects/causes.
We further note that due to the possibility of hidden confounders, features
potentially being a cause and genuine causes cannot be distinguished in the
response-based setting without introducing further assumptions.
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Table 1: Causal interpretation rules for relevant (
√
) and/or irrelevant (×) fea-
tures Xi in encoding and decoding models for stimulus- (C ≡ S) and response-
based (C ≡ R) paradigms.
relevance in encoding relevance in decoding causal interpretation rule
st
im
ul
us
-b
as
ed
√
X effect of S S1
× X no effect of S S2
√ 4! inconclusive S3
× 4! inconclusive S4
√ √
X effect of S S5
√ × X indirect effect of S S6
× √ provides brain state context S7
× × neither effect nor provides brain state context S8
re
sp
on
se
-b
as
ed
√ 4! inconclusive R1
× X no cause of R R2
√ 4! inconclusive R3
× 4! inconclusive R4
√ √ 4! inconclusive R5
√ × X no direct cause of R R6
× √ provides brain state context R7
× × neither cause nor provides brain state context R8
2.7 Reinterpretation of previous work in a causal frame-
work
In this section, we discuss previous work on the interpretation of encoding and
decoding models in light of the causal interpretation rules that we introduced
in the previous sections.
2.7.1 Potential confounds
In [40, 44] the problem of potential confounds in multi-voxel pattern analy-
sis (MVPA) has been discussed. In particular, Todd et al. demonstrated that
decoding models may determine brain state features as relevant that are sta-
tistically independent of the experimental condition. This finding is confirmed
by interpretation rules S7 and R7 that we presented in section 2.6. These rules
reveal that what Todd et al. termed confounds are exactly those features that
are irrelevant in encoding and relevant in decoding. Hence, our reinterpretation
in a causal framework re-emphasizes the potential problem highlighted in [40]
and additionally allows to specify the characteristics of such features, i. e. being
irrelevant in encoding and relevant in decoding.
In contrast to Todd et al. we do not term those features confounds, as this
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terminology suggests that such features invalidate interpretation of other fea-
tures and cannot be interpreted. Instead, we propose to use the terminology
features that provide brain state context. Knowledge about the specific charac-
teristics of features that provide brain state context wrt. S/R can indeed lead
to interesting causal statements, as demonstrated in [15]: under the additional
assumption of causal sufficiency, the assumption that all causally relevant fea-
tures have been observed, a causal influence of gamma oscillations (γ) on the
sensorimotor rhythm was concluded from the fact that γ ∈ X–enc+dec.
As we have shown in the previous section, encoding and decoding models
provide complementary information. We hence argue that the problem discussed
in [40, 44] is not a shortcoming of decoding models, but rather a useful feature.
Decoding models provide insights into causal structure that cannot be gained
by only investigating encoding models. Pitfalls are not due to weaknesses of
decoding models, but a result of negligent interpretation of relevant features.
Our findings are thus in line with Todd et al. and Woolgar et al. and strengthen
the point that MVPA results need to be interpreted carefully.
2.7.2 Linear encoding and decoding models
In [17] Haufe et al. demonstrated that linear backward models, i. e. linear de-
coding models, “cannot be interpreted in terms of the studied brain processes”,
as a large weight does not necessarily correspond to a feature that picks up the
signal and, vice-versa, a feature that picks up the signal does not necessarily
have a large weight. The causal interpretation rules S3, S4 and R3, R4 ex-
tend this argument to non-linear decoding models and yield a reinterpretation
of these findings in the framework of CBNs. What is more, our distinction of
stimulus- and response-based experimental settings allows us to specify the find-
ing that linear forward models, i. e. linear encoding models, are not affected by
this problem: in accordance with Haufe et al. we showed that in the stimulus-
based setting encoding models, both linear and non-linear, allow unambiguous
causal statements. However, in the response-based setting only those features
irrelevant in encoding are unproblematic to be interpreted as non-causes of R,
while the meaning of relevant features remains ambiguous in this setting.
For the linear case Haufe et al. presented an intriguing way to obtain an en-
coding from a decoding model. Linear models only allow to test for correlation,
and jointly Gaussian random variables are the only general case for which the
lack of correlation implies independence. As such, if one is willing to assume
that all variables are jointly Gaussian, this method together with our findings
yields an easy way to enrich causal interpretation when using linear models.
Firstly, in contrast to the decoding model one started with, the encoding model
obtained by inversion allows for causal statements on its own (interpretation
rules S1, S2 or R2). Secondly, since then both an encoding and a decoding
model are at hand, also interpretation rules S5-8 or R5-8 can be applied.
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2.7.3 Revisiting the introductory examples
We revisit the introductory examples for which we derived testable predictions
in section 2.2.
Firstly, consider the causal hypothesis amygdala activity → hippocampal ac-
tivity → explicit memory. The two predictions derived in section 2.2, i. e. that
amygdala activity is marginal dependent on explicit memory and becomes con-
ditionally independent given hippocampal activity, can be tested by assessing
the relevance of amygdala activity in a response-based encoding and decoding
model, respectively. Without employing further assumptions these conditions
are not sufficient to prove the hypothesized causal structure, though, as amyg-
dala activity ← hippocampal activity → explicit memory or amygdala activity
← h → hippocampal activity → explicit memory, where h is hidden, are also
consistent with the tested conditions. A statement that is warranted by in-
terpretation rule R6 in case that both predictions hold true is the following:
amygdala activity is not a direct cause of explicit memory.
Secondly, consider the causal hypothesis pre-stimulus alpha oscillations →
working memory. The prediction derived in section 2.2, i. e. pre-stimulus alpha
oscillations 6⊥ working memory, can be tested by assessing the relevance of pre-
stimulus alpha oscillations in a response-based encoding model. Testing this
prediction is again not sufficient to conclude the hypothesized causal structure:
in case the prediction holds true, pre-stimulus alpha oscillations is only poten-
tially a cause of working memory (cf. interpretation rule R1), as pre-stimulus
alpha oscillations ← h → working memory, where h is hidden, is also consis-
tent with the tested condition. Under the rather strong assumption of causal
sufficiency the existence of hidden confounders is denied, and the hypothesized
causal structure may indeed be concluded.
Note that a hypothesized causal structure can be rejected whenever one of
the conditional independences implied by the DAG is not present in the data.
3 Experimental Results
In this section, we demonstrate the empirical significance of our theoretical re-
sults on EEG data recorded during a visuo-motor learning task. We investigate
the neural basis of planning a reaching movement by training encoding and de-
coding models on EEG bandpower features derived from trial-periods in which
subjects have either been instructed to rest or to plan a reaching movement.
We chose this stimulus-based setting to illustrate our theoretical results, as
it admits less ambiguous causal interpretations than a response-based setting
(cf. Table 1).
We introduce the experimental setup and recorded data in section 3.1. For
simplicity, we omit details of the experimental setup that are irrelevant for the
stimulus-based setting. We then describe the data preprocessing steps and the
derivation of our brain state features in section 3.2. In section 3.3, we train
a nonlinear encoding and a nonlinear decoding model and determine the set
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of (ir-)relevant features for each model type. The causal conclusions, that can
be derived from our analysis, are presented in section 3.4. We first focus on
each model type independently, and then discuss further causal insights that
are obtained by combining encoding and decoding models.
3.1 Experimental setup and data
Subjects were trained in a visuo-motor learning paradigm to maximize the
smoothness of three-dimensional reaching movements performed with their right
hand. Specifically, subjects were placed approximately 1.5 m in front of a com-
puter screen displaying a 3D virtual reality scene. At the beginning of each
trial, subjects were shown the blank 3D virtual reality scene, instructing them
to rest (figure 2a). After five seconds, subjects were shown the position of their
arm, indicated by a ball with a black and white checkerboard texture, and the
target for the upcoming reaching movement, indicated by a ball with a yellow
and black checkerboard texture (figure 2b). This instructed subjects to plan
but not yet initiate the reaching movement. After a variable delay of 2.5 to 4
seconds, drawn from a uniform distribution, the yellow ball turned green, in-
structing subjects to carry out the movement (figure 2c). At the end of each
trial, subjects received feedback on the smoothness of their reaching movement,
derived from position measurements recorded by a motion tracking device (Im-
pulse X2 Motion Capture System, PhaseSpace, San Leandro, CA, U.S.), and
were instructed to return to the initial starting position (figure 2d). Each subject
carried out a total of 250 movements to randomly chosen locations within the
subject’s movement range, distributed across 5 blocks with brief intermissions
in between.
Throughout the training session, a 120-channel EEG, with electrodes placed
according to the extended 10-20 system, was recorded at 500 Hz sampling rate
using actiCAP electrodes and four BrainAmp DC amplifiers (BrainProducts,
Gilching, Germany). Prior to each training session, a five-minute resting-state
baseline was recorded, for which subjects were instructed to relax while looking
at a fixation cross displayed centrally on the screen. All recordings were carried
out with a reference electrode behind the left ear and converted to common
average reference offline.
Eighteen healthy male subjects (mean age 28.32± 8.48) participated in this
study. All subjects indicated that they are right-handed and conducted the
study with their right arm. Subjects gave informed consent in accordance with
guidelines set by the Max Planck Society. The study was approved by an ethics
committee of the Max Planck Society.
3.2 Data preprocessing and feature computation
In order to facilitate an across-subject analysis, we chose to train our models on
bandpower features derived from a group-wise independent component analysis
(ICA). This is particularly helpful as it allows to reduce the dimensionality of
the feature space and leads to physiologically interesting sources. We note that
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Visual feedback used during different phases of a trial. (a) Pre-trial
phase: the blank 3D virtual reality scene instructs the subject to relax. (b)
Planning phase: white and yellow balls appear, representing the position of the
subject’s right arm and the target location, respectively, instructing the subject
to plan but not yet initiate a reaching movement to the indicated location. (c)
Reaching phase: the target’s color switches to green, instructing the subject
to perform the reaching movement. (d) Return phase: having completed the
reaching movement, the subject is instructed to return to the initial starting
position, indicated by the green ball.
this cannot introduce artificial dependences between subjects’ trial data as long
as the ICA spatial filters obtained from resting state data are being held fixed
throughout further analysis. Furthermore, although the group-wise ICA seeks
independent components in the resting state data, the dependency structure
between those components may be very different during a task.
We first high-pass filtered the resting-state data of each subject at a cut-
off frequency of 3 Hz, and then performed a group-wise ICA on the combined
resting-state data of all subjects. We chose the SOBI algorithm [2] for this pur-
pose, as ICA algorithms based on second-order statistics have been shown to
outperform methods based on higher moments in group-wise analyses [21]. We
manually inspected the topography and spectrum of every resulting indepen-
dent component (IC) and rejected all ICs as non-cortical that did not exhibit a
clear dipolar topography [9]. The topographies and equivalent dipoles of the six
cortical ICs that we retained for further analyses are shown in figure 3. Equiva-
lent dipole locations were derived with a three-shell spherical head model with
standardized electrode locations, using the EEGLAB toolbox [8]. We note that
ICs 1 and 2, located in sensorimotor and occipital cortex, represent sensorimotor
and low-level visual processes, respectively. In contrast, ICs 3, 4 and 5, located
in precuneus, in the anterior cingulate, and at the intersection of cuneus and
precuneus, respectively, are generated in cortical areas linked to fronto-parietal
attention networks [5]. IC 6 appears to represent a sub-cortical source.
To compute the brain state features for the causal analysis, we first applied
the spatial filters of the six ICs in figure 3 to each subject’s EEG data recorded
during the training session, and then computed log-bandpower in the α-range
(8–14 Hz) for each subject, IC, and trial in two temporal windows. For the
first window, we selected a random 1.5 s window from each trial’s rest phase,
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excluding the first and last 500 ms to avoid carry-over effects. For the second
window, we selected a random 1.5 s window from each trial’s planning phase,
again avoiding the first and last 500 ms. Trials, in which subjects already
initiated the movement during the planning phase or did not reach the target
within 10 s, were excluded as invalid trials. We limited our analysis to the
α-band, as we found α-rhythms most relevant for predicting the progress of
visuo-motor learning in a previous study [24]. We excluded one subject from
further analyses, as we found this subject’s spectra to be contaminated by EMG
activity.
For each of the remaining 17 subjects, we thus obtained between 444 and 498
samples of a six-dimensional feature vector, representing log-bandpower in the
α-range of six cortical ICs in windows of 1.5 s length. In half of these samples,
subjects had been instructed to rest, while in the other half subjects had been
instructed to plan a reaching movement.
3.3 Model training and feature analysis
In the present context, the experimental condition C corresponds to the instruc-
tion to either rest or to plan a reaching movement. As this instruction always
preceded the time-window used to compute the corresponding brain state fea-
tures, we are working in a stimulus-based setting, i. e. C ≡ S (cf. section 2.3).
Our brain state features X = {X1, ..., X6} correspond to log-bandpower in the
α-range of the cortical ICs in figure 3. In the following, we first describe how
we trained a nonlinear encoding and a nonlinear decoding model to distin-
guish between relevant and irrelevant brain state features in each model type.
The models were trained on each subject’s features individually. We then dis-
cuss how we combined the experimental results across subjects to identify the
(ir-)relevant feature sets on a group-level. These sets form the basis for the
causal interpretation in section 3.4.
3.3.1 Encoding analysis
To quantify the relevance of features in encoding, we employed a non-linear in-
dependence test based on the Hilbert–Schmidt independence criterion (HSIC)
[14, 15]. The HSIC test utilizes a kernel independence measure, capable of
detecting linear as well as non-linear dependences between arbitrary input vari-
ables. The p-values of the HSIC tests were computed using a permutation
analysis with 1000 permutations. The kernel size for the HSIC tests was set
to the median distance between points in input space [14]. For each subject
and feature, this resulted in a p-value that quantifies the probability that the
observed data has been generated under the precondition S ⊥ Xi (cf. Table 2).
3.3.2 Decoding analysis
We used a random forest classifier (RF) [3] to decode the experimental condition
from the brain state features. For each RF model, 100 trees were grown using
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(a) IC 1, RV 5.88% (b) IC 2, RV 3.28% (c) IC 3, RV 4.39%
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Figure 3: Topographies and equivalent dipole locations of the six cortical ICs
from the group-wise ICA. The residual variances of the equivalent dipole fits
are denoted by RV.
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Table 2: p-values that quantify the probability of S ⊥ Xi for each subject
and feature. Values exceeding 0.05 are highlighted in gray. The p-values of
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov permutation test, that quantify the probability of the
values of each IC being drawn from a uniform distribution, are denoted by KSp.
Subject IC 1 IC 2 IC 3 IC 4 IC 5 IC 6
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0.017 0 0
3 0 0 0 0.006 0 0.522
4 0 0.029 0.151 0.002 0.192 0.002
5 0 0 0 0.012 0.003 0.037
6 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.202
7 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0.061 0
9 0.061 0 0.097 0.265 0.012 0.596
10 0 0 0 0.008 0 0.001
11 0 0 0 0.005 0 0.036
12 0 0 0.001 0.07 0.001 0
13 0 0 0 0.013 0 0.217
14 0 0.027 0.055 0.363 0.102 0.246
15 0 0 0 0.025 0.005 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0.032
17 0.357 0.024 0.019 0.749 0.003 0.001
KSp 0 0 0 0 0 0
bagging, i. e. for every tree a training subset (63.2% of the whole training set)
was drawn by sampling with replacement. While growing the trees, at each node
the best split of b√6c = 2 (as suggested in [4]) randomly chosen features was
used. Estimates of prediction accuracy (PE*) were obtained by leave-one-trial-
out cross-validation. This resulted in the subject-specific decoding accuracies
shown in Table 3. A Wilcoxon signed rank test rejected the null-hypothesis of
chance-level decoding accuracies on the group-level with p = 2.9305e− 04.
Table 3: Prediction accuracy estimates for every subject in percentage of cor-
rectly decoded trials with all features intact (PE*).
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
PE* 83.83 69.92 73.08 60.14 60.37 71.11 74.15 73.39 58.61
Subject 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
PE* 72.28 82.34 65.79 74.19 60.82 66.03 67.95 53.11
To quantify the relevance of features in decoding, we then successively per-
muted every feature 1000 times and compared the resulting PEs to the PE with
all features intact (PE*). For each subject and feature, this resulted in a p-value
that quantifies the probability that the observed data has been generated under
the precondition S ⊥ Xi|X \Xi (cf. Table 4).
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3.3.3 Identifying (ir-)relevant feature sets on the group-level
In order to identify the (ir-)relevant features on the group-level, we make use
of the fact that by construction p-values are uniformly distributed under the
null-hypothesis. In the present context, this implies that if a feature is ir-
relevant in encoding/decoding, the 17 subject-specific p-values of this feature
are drawn from a uniform distribution. This enables us to use a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov permutation test (KS test) (with 105 permutations), for each feature
and model type, to quantify the probability of the set of observed p-values under
the assumption of (conditional) independence. We reject the null-hypothesis of
S ⊥ Xi or S ⊥ Xi|X \ Xi, for the encoding or decoding side, respectively, if
the resulting p-value of the KS test is below the significance level α = 0.05.
Conversely, we accept the null-hypothesis if the p-value across subjects exceeds
β = 0.10. In this way, we can test each feature’s significance for encoding and
decoding on a group-level, while avoiding problems in causal analysis related to
pooling features across multiple subjects [32].
The resulting p-values are shown in Table 2 and 4 for the encoding and
decoding analysis, respectively. For the encoding side, we find all six cortical
ICs to be relevant. For the decoding side, we only find ICs 1 and 2 to be relevant.
We hence obtain the following sets of (ir-)relevant features on the group-level:
• X+enc = {X1, ..., X6}
• X–enc = ∅
• X+dec = {X1, X2}
• X–dec = {X3, X4, X5, X6}
This enables us to distinguish between ICs that are relevant only for encoding
and ICs that are relevant in both model types: X+enc–dec = {X3, X4, X5, X6} and
X+enc+dec = {X1, X2}.
3.4 Causal analysis
Having identified the sets of (ir-)relevant features, we proceed to apply our
causal interpretation rules. We first consider each model type independently,
and then discuss causal conclusions that can be derived from considering both
models jointly.
3.4.1 Encoding model only
From X+enc = {X1, ..., X6} and interpretation rule S1, it follows that S is causal
for the α-bandpower of every IC. Accordingly, we find that every IC in figure 3
responds to the instruction to plan a reaching movement. The specific role of
each of these cortical processes, however, remains speculative.
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Table 4: p-values that quantify the probability of S ⊥ Xi|X\Xi for each subject
and feature. Values exceeding 0.05 are highlighted in gray. The p-values of
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov permutation test, that quantify the probability of the
values of each IC being drawn from a uniform distribution, are denoted by KSp.
Subject IC 1 IC 2 IC 3 IC 4 IC 5 IC 6
1 0.82 0.167 0.804 0.37 0.023 0.261
2 0.022 0 0.589 0.812 0.655 0.573
3 0.002 0 0.632 0.233 0.85 0.354
4 0.036 0.159 0.58 0.161 0.392 0.511
5 0.658 0 0.505 0.401 0.645 0.646
6 0.08 0 0.419 0.512 0.794 0.694
7 0.259 0 0.014 0.414 0.139 0.529
8 0 0 0.551 0.506 0.542 0.046
9 0.802 0.034 0.134 0.336 0.691 0.725
10 0.233 0 0.805 0.723 0.406 0.611
11 0 0.122 0.043 0.406 0.777 0.015
12 0.062 0.424 0.858 0.798 0.711 0.042
13 0.164 0 0.463 0.438 0.235 0.214
14 0 0.553 0.183 0.701 0.121 0.549
15 0.209 0.928 0.001 0.431 0.45 0.527
16 0.017 0.534 0.259 0.81 0.712 0.662
17 0.514 0.276 0.877 0.528 0.545 0.699
KSp 0 0 0.504 0.340 0.787 0.126
3.4.2 Decoding model only
The above chance-level decoding accuracy on the group-level indicates that at
least one of the six ICs is an effect S. Interpretation rules S3 and S4, however,
forbid any further causal interpretation.
3.4.3 Combination of the encoding and the decoding model
From X+enc–dec = {X3, X4, X5, X6} in combination with interpretation rule S6, we
conclude that ICs 3–6 are only indirect effects of S. As X+enc+dec = {X1, X2}, we
can further conclude that at least one of ICs 1 and 2 is a direct effect of S. This
follows from the fact that if X1 and X2 were both indirect effects, all observed
brain state features would be indirect effects.
We note that these causal conclusions are in line with the roles commonly
attributed to the corresponding cortical areas. Specifically, the higher-level cor-
tical areas represented by ICs 3–5 are only found to be indirectly modulated by
the instruction to plan a reaching movement. In contrast, low-level sensorimotor
and visual areas, represented by ICs 1 and 2, respectively, are found to contain
at least one direct effect of the instruction to plan a movement.
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4 Discussion
The rules presented in this work provide a guideline to researchers which causal
statements are and which ones are not supported by empirical data when analyz-
ing encoding and decoding models. In particular, we argued that only encoding
models in stimulus-based paradigms support unambiguous causal statements.
We demonstrated that further causal insights can be derived by combining en-
coding and decoding models, and illustrated the significance of this theoretical
result on experimental data. While we have chosen an EEG study for this
illustration, our causal interpretation rules apply to any type of brain state fea-
ture. In the following, we discuss limitations and potential extensions of this
framework.
4.1 The iid assumption in neuroimaging
It is likely that neither of the iid assumptions is met by neuroimaging data.
Consider for example subjects getting tired through the course of an experiment.
In this case, the features for later trials may follow another distribution than
those for earlier trials, violating the assumption of identical distributions. Also
the brain’s state may depend on previous activations and hence later trials
may be dependent on previous trials, violating the independence assumption.
As statistical tests rest on the iid assumption, it is important to consider this
limitation when interpreting test results.
4.2 Finite empirical data
Our theoretical arguments rest on the assumption that it is possible to distin-
guish between relevant and irrelevant features in encoding and decoding models,
i. e. that we have access to an oracle for univariate independence and multi-
variate conditional independence tests. In practice, we are faced with several
interrelated problems. Firstly, the identification of irrelevant features rests on
the readiness to interpret negative results. We need to interpret the lack of evi-
dence against independence as evidence in favor of it. As such, we need to keep
in mind that observing more data and/or using more powerful (conditional)
independence tests may falsify previous statistical tests, thereby altering our
causal conclusions. Secondly, we either need to employ non-linear encoding and
decoding models to test for (conditional) independences, as in the analysis of
our experimental data in section 3, or we need to assume that all observed brain
state features are jointly Gaussian. This follows from the fact that linear mod-
els only test for uncorrelatedness, and in general uncorrelatedness only implies
independence if all variables are jointly Gaussian. Note that other frameworks
enable causal discovery in linear models, e.g. by introducing the additional as-
sumption of additive non-Gaussian noise [37, 19]. Lastly, it is difficult to base
conditional independence tests on permutation approaches, as these are biased
towards conditional dependence [39]. The development of unbiased conditional
independence tests is an area of active research [45].
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4.3 Univariate vs multivariate analysis
We based our causal analysis on commonly employed and intuitive notions of
feature relevance (cf. section 2.4). In encoding models, a feature is relevant if it
varies with the experimental condition. This corresponds to an univariate inde-
pendence test Xi ⊥ C. In decoding models, a feature is relevant if it cannot be
removed without increasing the minimum Bayes error. This corresponds to a
multivariate conditional independence test Xi ⊥ C|X \Xi. The interpretation
rules presented in this work apply whenever these tests are employed, indepen-
dently of whether encoding and decoding models or direct statistical tests for
(conditional) independence are being used [14, 45].
We note that there are instances in which decoding models are used to carry
out an encoding analysis. Consider the searchlight technique [20]. Here, it
is tested whether a set of k voxels as a whole contains information about the
experimental condition. In this case, the decoding model is used for a marginal
independence test C ⊥ {Xi1 , ..., Xik}. This approach is oblivious to the causal
structure within the set {Xi1 , ..., Xik}. As such, the searchlight technique does
not provide causal insights beyond those implied by an encoding model. The
additional insights offered by decoding models rest on multivariate conditional
independence tests.
4.4 Whole brain analysis
In case of a high-dimensional feature space, e. g. voxels in fMRI or bandpower
features in high-density EEG recordings, training a decoding model on the whole
feature set may be infeasible. To harness the additional insights provided by a
decoding model, it may be necessary to reduce the feature space dimensionality
before training a decoding model, e. g. by clustering for fMRI or ICA for EEG
recordings. We note that it is not trivial to reduce the dimensionality of the
feature space without discarding causally relevant information.
4.5 Untestable assumptions
As it is the case for any type of empirical inference, causal inference also rests on
a set of untestable assumptions. In particular, causal inference in the framework
of CBNs rests on the CMC and the assumption of faithfulness. Theoretical
results show that the set of unfaithful distributions has measure zero relative to
all probability distributions that can be generated by a given DAG [23]. As long
as nature has no particular reason to favor unfaithful distributions, we are thus
unlikely to encounter them in practice. We note that further assumptions might
allow stronger causal statements, e. g. the assumption of causal sufficiency rules
out the existence of hidden common causes.
4.6 Causal inference in neuroimaging
We note that the rules presented here have, to a certain extent, already been ap-
plied in the context of neuroimaging [32, 15, 41, 26]. The primary contribution
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of our work is to point out their relation to widely used methods for analyzing
neuroimaging data. In particular, we show that interpreting encoding and de-
coding models is a form of causal inference. Given the prevalent use of causal
terminology in the interpretation of neuroimaging studies, we believe it is es-
sential to make the inherent assumptions and limitations explicit. We further
note that combining encoding and decoding models is only a first step towards
a causal analysis of empirical data. More detailed insights can be obtained by
additional conditional independence tests, e. g. by training decoding models on
subsets of variables and/or permuting subsets of variables. Causal inference al-
gorithms like the PC or FCI algorithm are designed for tackling such questions
and hence can yield more detailed causal insights [30, 38]. In contrast, encod-
ing and decoding models are not especially designed for these purposes but, as
shown, might still warrant some causal interpretation.
We close by emphasizing that, if relevant features in encoding and decoding
models are interpreted in a causal sense, one inevitably accepts the untestable
assumptions and limitations expatiated in this article. The only way to elude
this situation, in case one is not willing to make those assumptions, is to resign
from causal interpretations.
If not only correlational statements but ultimately neural causes of cognition
are of interest, further assumptions and causal inference algorithms, which go
beyond encoding and decoding models, should be considered. Future research
may investigate how causal inference methods can be facilitated in neuroimag-
ing, discuss the appropriateness of different assumptions, and explore possible
ways to weaken or refine those assumptions in case of neuroimaging data.
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